A copy of the Supreme Court’s decision in the VanDerStok case is available here. This case was more of a regulatory issue than a Constitutional question. This is not a Second Amendment case.
The decision contains some positive news as well as some negative news. On the positive side, the court did not accept the Biden administration’s argument that AR-15 receivers could be readily converted into machine guns.
(c) The plaintiffs’ arguments about the linguistic differences between subsections (A) and (B) and potential unintended consequences under the National Firearms Act (NFA) are unpersuasive. The government represents that AR–15 receivers do not qualify as machinegun receivers, and this Court’s analysis of the GCA does not suggest ATF has authority to regulate them as such under the NFA.
On the negative side, the court accepted the arguments regarding serial numbers on gun parts, though the ruling was fairly narrow. A facial challenge is very difficult to win in that the court must say the regulation is invalid under all possible circumstances. They are saying that if you have something that is almost a frame or receiver, it is OK to define it as a frame or a receiver. This was decided under the Administrative Procedure Act, not the Second Amendment. The court has left open the option to the Trump administration to repeal these regulations or redefine the regulations to more clearly define what weapons parts kits fall under what a firearm is.
While we recognize the problem, this case does not require us to untangle exactly how far subsection (A) reaches. The plaintiffs argue only that §478.11’s provision addressing weapon parts kits is facially inconsistent with the statute. The Fifth Circuit adopted the same view after coming to the unqualified conclusion that weapon parts kits can never satisfy the statute’s two tests. To resolve this case, it is enough to say those assessments are mistaken. Because at least some weapon parts kits satisfy both of subsection (A)’s tests, §478.11 is not facially invalid. Future cases may present other and more difficult questions about ATF’s regulations. But we take cases as they come and today resolve only the question posed to us.
The second footnote of the decision explains how these regulations could be challenged in the future. The court should have dealt directly with this.
The dissents raise a number of questions about what test courts should apply when a party contends that an agency has acted in excess of its statutory authority in a pre-enforcement challenge under the APA. Post, at 7 (opinion of THOMAS, J.); post, at 3 (opinion of ALITO, J.). But the theories the dissents proceed to advance were not pressed or passed upon below, nor did the parties make them before this Court. Cf. post, at 5 (opinion of ALITO, J.) (suggesting that the Court ask for supplemental briefing). In these circumstances, we believe the better course is to leave further analysis of the proper test for another day and address the parties’ dispute as they have chosen to frame it. Nor, on remand, may the parties seek to inject arguments about the proper test that they did not pursue here. See Ohio v. Environmental Protection Agency, 603 U. S. 279, 299 (2024) (forfeiture); Sibbald v. United States, 12 Pet. 488, 492 (1838) (law of the case); contra, post, at 9 (THOMAS, J., dissenting)
Justice Thomas sums up his concerns about the majority’s decision that if you have something that is almost a frame or receiver, it is OK to define it as a frame or a receiver.
Congress could have authorized ATF to regulate any part of a firearm or any object readily convertible into one. But, it did not. I would adhere to the words Congress enacted. Employing its novel “artifact noun” methodology, the majority charts a different course that invites unforeseeable consequences and offers no limiting principle. I respectfully dissent.
Justice Thomas’ dissent in VanDerStok decision
The Biden administration argued that this was an important crime-fighting tool, but we have long explained why that claim is wrong.
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We have tried registration systems for decades but haven’t identified any crimes that these systems have helped solve.
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In a 2013 deposition in the case District of Columbia v. Heller II, the Washington, D.C. police chief couldn’t recall any specific case of registration records helping to identify who committed a crime, aside from possession offenses.
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In 2000, Honolulu’s police chief testified before the Hawaii State Senate, stating that despite reviewing records since gun registration and licensing began in 1960, he couldn’t find any crimes solved through registration regulations. The police chief said that his officers spent around 50,000 hours each year registering and licensing guns. This time could have been better spent on proven, traditional law enforcement tasks.
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Maryland and New York spent many tens of millions of dollars compiling a computer database registering guns and containing the ballistic “fingerprints” of every gun sold over a 15-year period. Despite these states strongly favoring gun control, even they eventually abolished their systems because they failed to solve a single crime.
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In 2010, Canada examined its registration and licensing program. But the Royal Canadian Mounted Police couldn’t identify any cases where registration was necessary to solve the crime.
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Technology is also making the production of guns even more difficult to regulate. With 3D metal printers, people can now make weapons that are indistinguishable from those purchased in stores.
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